This paper investigates the measurement of competition in the Polish banking sector and is driven by scarce evidence in this respect. As has been proven for other industries, competition is likely to have far-reaching implications for economic growth, productivity, financial stability and, consequently, consumer welfare. Theoretical and empirical research that can assess the extent of competition in banking, therefore, has important implications for government agencies responsible for the effective regulation and supervision of the financial system (Beck et al., 2004; Boyd and De Nicolό, 2005, Boyd et al, 2006; Berger et al, 2009; Samaniego, 2010) .
This paper presents estimates of competition in bank loan market in Poland using a well grounded approach, indroduced by and developed in many studies (for references see table 1 and 2). The so called Panzar-Rosse H-statistics is defined as the sum of the elasticities of a bank's total revenue with respect to that bank's input prices see also Turk Ariss, 2010) . Under monopoly, the H-statistics should be smaller than or equal to zero. In contrast, in the models of monopolistic competition and perfect competition, the H-statistic should lie between 0 and 1. Finally, under perfect competition, the H-statistics is equal to 1. Overall, a larger H-statistics indicates a higher degree of competition. We apply the methodology used in the estimation of the H-statistics to a unique dataset of quarterly individual banks' financial items spanning the years 2008-2012.
Unlike previous papers which attempt to measure the competition intensity in Poland applying annual unbalanced financial data on banking sector available in the Bankscope database, we use data handcollected from Monitor Polski B and webpages of commercial banks. Where it is necessary we supplement this data which information accessed from Polish Financial Supervisory Authority.
Upon analysis of results, one can conclude that competition evolves differently across years in Poland. In some years, competition was relatively high, as the H-statistics reached the level of 0.75, which is relatively close to perfect competition. In other years it gradually decreased reaching its bottom line in 2010, and took upward trend in 2011 and 2012. Generally, the values of our competitive environment measure indicate at monopolistic competition in Poland.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of different approaches in the literature to measure competition in banking industry across the world as well as in the Polish banking market. Section 3 provides description of methodology and data applied in the invesitgation. Section 4 presents results of empirical study. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
COMPETITION INTENSITY MEASUREMENT -A LITERATURE REVIEW

Measures of competition intensity
The actual literature on the measurement of competition is broadly classified into two major streams (Bikker, 2004; Tabak et al., 2012) . One of those streams include the so-called structural approaches which are based on the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm and use market structure measures such a concentration ratios, number of banks or Herfindahl indices. These indicators measure the actual market shares without allowing inferences on the competitive behavior of banks. They are rather crude measures that do not take into account that banks with different ownership behave differently and that banks might not compete directly with each other in the same line of business. Moreover, they do not measure the competitive conduct of banks at the margin. Thus, they may not be the most appropriate indicators for measuring bank competition (Bikker, 2004; Casu and Girardone, 2006 and Schaeck et al., 2009 , Carbo-Valverde et al., 2009 .
The other stream covers non-structural approaches that have been promoted in the socalled New Empirical Industrial Organisation (NEIO) literature. Within NEIO framework, there are two main types of econometric methodologies. One of them is a simulatenousequation method, which is represented by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) . This method estimates the level of competition intensity by simultaneously considering supply and demand functions to identify a parameter that measures the behaviors of banks. The most challenging issue with this approach is that it requires detailed data on bank financials, which are hardly accessible.
The second type of methodology includes approaches in which the parameters that reflect the degree of competition in specific markets are estimated with application of bank-level data and specific assumptions on the behavior of banks. The Lerner index, Panzar-Rosse Hstatistics as well as the Boone indicator, fall into this part of the literature.
The Lerner index is designed with the assumption that market power may also be related to profits, in the sense that extremely high profits may be indicative of a lack of competition. This index has been widely used in recent bank research (see e.g. Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004; Berger et al., 2009; Fiordelisi and Cipolini, 2012; Fu, 2014) and indicates a bank's market power by considering the difference between price and marginal cost as a percentage of price. The degree of competition is given by the range 0< Lerner index <1. In the case of perfect competition, the Lerner index equals 0; under a pure monopoly, the Lerner index equals 1. A Lerner index <0 implies pricing below the marginal cost and could result, e.g., from non-optimal bank behavior.
The H-Statistics, which measures the reaction of output to input prices, gauges the competitive behavior of banks, but imposes certain restrictive assumptions on banks' cost function. Specifically, under perfect competition, increases in input prices cause total revenue and marginal cost to move together, while in imperfect competition they do not. However, the inference from this measure derived from the profit-maximizing condition is only valid if the market in question is in equilibrium. Estimates of the H-Statistics vary widely, as the studies by Claessens and Laeven (2004) , Bikker and Spierdijk (2007) and Olivero et al. (2011) show, and suffer from a few flaws as is explained in Shaffer (2004) .
With respect to the "Boone" indicator or the profit elasticity (PE) model for measuring bank competition, this indicator is often seen as a proxy for competition, in the sense that the most efficient banks (and therefore the most competitive ones) will gain market share at the cost of the less efficient banks. This measure has gained considerable support recently (Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2007 Van Leuvensteijn, 2008; Schaeck and Cihák, 2010; Delis, 2012; Tabak et al., 2012) .
While the measures mentioned above have been broadly accepted, there is no consensus regarding which is the most suitable indicator for quantifying bank competition (Carbó Valverde et al., 2009) . As a matter of fact, these measures whose estimation results are presented in different research papers often produce divergent conclusions for banking markets of the same countries and groups of countries (see e.g. Turk-Ariss, 2010 and Spierdijk, 2010) . This diversity in results can be inferred from Table 1 , which reviews mostly contemporary literature on competition in the banking industry. Generally, the divergence in results may be explained by differences in background methodologies and differences in bank data samples applied. Notwithstanding these discrepancies, it seems that prevailing competition model in the banking industry is monopolistic competition. Faculty of Management Working Paper Series 4/ 2013
Competition intensity in Poland -the review of empirical evidence
The empirical evidence on the intensity of competition in Polish banking industry is rather scant. The available studies include cross country analyses in which Polish banking market is one of many other banking markets (see e.g. Beck et al., 2004; Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Turk-Ariss, 2010; Agoraki et al., 2011; Beck et al., 2013; Mirzaei et al., 2013) and only a few papers focusing on the Polish banks alone (Pawłowska 2005 (Pawłowska , 2010 (Pawłowska , 2012 . These analyses apply a wide range of competition measures, from simple market structure indicators, such as concentration ratio or HHI (see e.g. Pawłowska, 2012; Mirzaei et al., 2013; ) to indicators justified in the NEIO literature, i.e. the Lerner index (see e.g. Pawłowska, 2012; Turk-Ariss, 2010; Agoraki et al., 2012) and the Panzar-Rosse H -Statisitcs (see e.g. Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Bikker and Spierdijk, 2008; Pawłowska, 2005; . The summary of the studies which apply NEIO approaches are presented in Table 2 .
The results for both the Lerner index and Panzar-Rosse H-statistics show varying degrees of market power across year and suggest a monopolistic competition in the Polish banking industry. The Panzar-Rosse H-statistics has been usually estimated in a regression in which dependent variable is interest income normalized by total assets or loans (II/A or II/L). Generally, it can be seen that the so-called H-statistics developed by Panzar and Rosse has been employed in a small number of empirical studies on bank competition in Poland (Pawłowska, 2010 (Pawłowska, , 2012 .
As can be inferred from Table 2 the estimation techniques applied to compute the Hstatistics are diversified, and include pooled OLS, GLS and GMM. It is worth noting here that application of pooled OLS estimator to dynamic panel data is controversial, as structural parameters obtained with its application are usually biased (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Greene, 2012; Baltagi, 2005) . (2012) Source: Claessens and Laeven (2004), Bikker and Spierdijk (2005) , Pawłowska (2005 Pawłowska ( , 2010 Pawłowska ( , 2012 , Turk-Ariss (2010).
METHODOLOGY
We use the Panzar-Rosse approach to assess the competitive nature of banking market in Poland. The so-called H-statistic developed by Panzar and Rosse has been employed in a small number of empirical studies on bank competition in Poland (Pawłowska, 2010 (Pawłowska, , 2012 . The H-statistic is defined as the sum of the elasticities of a bank's total revenue with respect to that bank's input prices (Rosse and Panzar, 1977; ; see also Turk Ariss, 2010). Under monopoly, the H-statistic should be smaller than or equal to zero. In contrast, in the models of monopolistic competition and perfect competition, the H-statistic should be between 0 and 1. Finally, under perfect competition, the H-statistic is equal to 1. Overall, a larger H-statistic indicates a higher degree of competition. Nathan and Neave (1989) point out that this interpretation assumes the the test is undertaken on observations that are in the long run equilibrium. We therefore also test whether the observations which we apply in our study are in long-run equilibrium.
Competitive environment test
To approximate the H-statistic empirically, we follow Bikker and Haaf (2002) , Claessens and Laeven (2004) and Schaeck et al. (2009) :
where:
 the superscript i denotes bank i, and the uperscript t denotes quarter t;  ln_II_TA -interest revenue to total assets (this our proxy for output price);  ln_AFR -average funding rate, i.e. the ratio of interest expenses to total assets;  ln_PPE -price of personal expediture is the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets (proxy for the price of labor);  ln_PCE -price of capital expediture, i.e. the ratio of other operating and administrative expenses to fixed assets (proxy for price of fixed capital);  controls -control variables, including: loans to assets ratio (ln_LNS_TA); stable funding to average liabilities ratio (ln_DPS_F); bank own funds to illiquid assets ratio (ln_EQ_TA), non-interest income (ln_OI_II).  ε it -random error Here, H = β1 + β2 + β3.
We begin with a standard model that takes into consideration the panel nature of data, i.e. random-effects generalised least squares regression (GLS). As an alternative we consider a fixed effects regression. In both models the same set of explanatory variables was used, selected in accordance with the theory and the results of empirical studies examined. The choice between fixed effects and random effects models may be justified by theory -in general fixed-effects model should be used if the differences between individuals may be captured through different constant value in the model, and it is not always possible to assume that individual random effect is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, which is assumed in the random effects model (Baltagi, 2005) ; may be reflected in other empirical studies (autors adapting the Panzar-Rosse approach P-R use fixed effects models); may be verified by statistical test (e.g. Breusch-Pagan and Hausman tests). Bikker et al. (2007) and Bikker et al. (2012) demonstrate that taking interest income as share of total assets, or the inclusion of scale variables as explanatory variables, may lead to overestimate competition and distorted tests results. Instead, they suggest using unscaled variables, i.e. using interest income, as the dependent variable. However, for the analysis of the effect of competition on bank risk we use the scaled version of the H-statistics, as we would like to be able to compare our results with those of Pawłowska (2010 Pawłowska ( , 2012 .
Equilibrium test
Since the PR model is only valid if the market is in the long run equilibrium, we test for this assumption by estimating the following equation for the banking sector in Poland:
Where ROA is the return on assets. We define equilibrium E-statistics as β1 + β2 + β3. We test whether E=0, using F-test. If rejected, the market is assumed not to be in equilibrium. The idea beind this test is that, in equilibrium, risk-adjusted rates of return should be equal across banks and returns on bank assets should not be related to input prices. This approach for testing whether the observations are in long-run equilibrium has previously been used in the literature (see e.g. Shaffer, 1982; Molyneux et al., 1996; Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Schaeck et al., 2009 ).
Dynamic panel model
An alternative method to estimate the H-statistic by Panzar and Rosse is a dynamic model, taking into account the lagged endogenous variables. Dynamic panel estimation eliminates the need for a market equilibrium assumption. This model requires an appropriate estimation procedure, due to the failure to meet the assumptions of the lack of correlation between the explanatory variable and a random component. We use the estimation procedure proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and its modification proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) . This approach involves the use of appropriate instruments for the explanatory variables correlated with a random component and is optimal for short time dimension panels.
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Data
We use bank level data from financial statements available in Monitor Polski B, on web pages of commercial banks and supplement this information with data which can be accessed from the Polish Financial Supervisory Authority. We have quartely panel data for the years 2008-2012, and we include 53 commercial banks, for which, our dataset was compiled. In Table 3 and 4 is given summary information on data used in this research, i.e. descriptive statistics and correlation matrix. Additionally, in Figure A included in the Appendix we depict distribution charts of dependent variable and main independent variables. 
ESTIMATION RESULTS
Full sample estimation
In this section we present full sample estimation of our model specified following Eq. (1)-(3).
In the first step we show results of GLS fixed effects estimation. Next, we proceed to analysis of long-run equilibrium. And in the last step we show results of GMM dynamic estimation. Following previous studies estimating the Panzar-Rosse H-statistics (Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Pawłowska, 2012) in our paper we also apply the conventional OLS technique. However, as the competition measures estimated with OLS are biased, we include these results -just for informative purposes, in table in Appendix.
GLS full sample estimation
In order to select an appropriate version of GLS model (i.e. between fixed or random effects) we have tested the validity of the panel model using the Breusch-Pagan test and Hausman test.
The Breusch-Pagan test, based on Lagrange multipliers, rejected the null hypothesis of a constant variance, i.e. it must be held that the random effects are important and that a model of pooled regresion should not be built.
Hausman test assumes that the individual effects are independent of the explanatory variables. If this hypothesis holds, both fixed effect and random effect estimators are unbiased, but the random effect estimator is considered as more efficient. In contrast, the rejection of the null hypothesis in favor of an alternative means that fixed effect estimator is consistent or an error in the model specification occured. Hausman test, comparing coefficients estimated by fixed and random effects models, indicates no statistically significant difference, thus the assumption of fixed effects should be considered correct. 
Table 5. Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test and Hausman test
.3938087 e | .0098195 .0990935 u | .0252608 .1589364 Test:
Var(u) = 0 chibar2(01) = 2292.41 Prob > chibar2 = 0.0000 The selected version of panel model (fixed effects) is presented in Table 6 . In appendix we also present the estimation results for our baseline model (i.e. with random effects).
Among the results of estimation we should focus on the following coefficients -R 2 : within=0,68 means that 68% of intragroup diversification has been explained by the explanatory variables; between=0,76 means that 76% differentiation of endogenous variable between banks has been explained by the explanatory variables; overall=0,74 means that 74% of overall differentaition of endogenous variable has been explained by the explanatory variables. The explanation of differentiation can be considered satisfactory.
The coefficients in estimated models, are in line with expectations -the sign of ln_LNS_TA turned out to be positive in the revenue equation -which can be interpreted as the fact that banks compensate themselves for credit risk by surcharges on the lending rate, which increases interest income. The influence of ln_DPS_F on interest income is rather unpredictable. The ln_EQ_TA has a negative impact on interest income, i.e. lower equity ratio implies more interest income. However, capital requirements increase as the risk increases, suggesting a positive sign of a coefficient.
In addition, the diagnostic tests for the accuracy of constructed fixed effects model were performed. The test for residuals normality -graphical analysis of the distributions shows a high similarity with the normal distribution and the concentration of the residues around zero even higher than in a normal distribution (see Figure B in Appendix). Nevertheless, the Jarque-Bera test rejects the hypothesis that the disturbances are normally distributed. Table 6 . Estimation of competition intensity using fixed-effects GLS regression. 
We have also tested H-statistic for estimated fixed effect model. The null hypothesis H fe = 0 had to be rejected (F(1, 749) = 670.43 and prob = 0.0000) as well as the hypothesis H fe = 1 (F(1,749) = 119.77 and prob = 0.0000). That means that banking sector in Poland can be described as monopolistic competition -the H-statistic is between 0 and 1.
Testing for long-run equilibrium
As has been metioned in the previous section, the PR model is only valid if the market is in the long run equilibrium. This long run-equilibrium is usually tested with a model in which dependent varable is ROA, and independent variables are the same as in our baseline model (i.e. Eq.(1) ). For detailed estimation results of Eq.(2) please refer to Table E included in Appendix. Here we focus only on the conclusions which are derived from this test. First, the hypothesis on the long-run equilibrium in the Polish banking sector (E = β1 + β2 + β3 = 0) has to be rejected at the significance level of 5% (F(1, 608) = 10.92, prob = 0.0010). Second, the hypothesis that E = 1 cannot be rejected (F(1, 608) = 0.54, prob = 0.4647), which means that it cannot be stated that H <0 and there is no long-run equilibrium. However, as is argued by Matthews et al. (2007) the restirction that E=0 (i.e. market equilibrium) is necessary for the perfect competition case, but not for the monopolistic competition case, which is typical of the Polish banking sector (see also Stavarek and Repkova, 2011) .
Although the results suggest that over the whole estimation period the market was not in equilibrium, we cannot reject this hypothesis for the sub-periods. For particular years the hypothesis that E= 0 cannot be rejected (see Table 7 ). 
Dynamic estimation
Due to the fact that our dataset exhibits dynamic features we follow procedure developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and further elaborated by Blundell and Bond (1998) Table 8 below.
Table 8. Estimation of competition intensity using two-step GMM (Arellano-Bond / Blundell-Bond)
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
As the quality of estimators in dynamic GMM model depends on several tests, we conduct such testing (see Table 9 ). The first is Arellano-Bond test regarding autocorrelation of residuals. We find that there is no reason to reject the null hypothesis of absence of autocorrelation. The other is the Sargan test of over-identyfying restrictions, which checks whether orthogonality conditions have been sufficiently met. Sargan test suggests proper application of the instruments. 
Due to the fact that the model was estimated using a two-step procedure, errors of estimators can be biased, so the one-step procedure has been used to ensure the accuracy of standard errors. This action resulted in elimination of potential bias of the results. The analysis of the coefficients determined followig a two-step and one-step methods, leads to the conclusion that all used variables are statistically significant. Detailed estimation results for one-step estimation can be found in Table C in the Appendix.
Following previous research mentioned in this paper we test the H-statistics for our dynamic panel model. The null hypothesis H 2step = 0 had to be rejected (Chi 2 (1) = 910.80 and prob = 0.0000) as well as the hypothesis H 2step = 1 (Chi 2 (1) = 154.83 and prob = 0.0000). This confirms earlier results that banking sector in Poland can be described as monopolistic competition -the values of H-statistics are between 0 and 1.
Developments of the Panzar-Rosse H-statistics over time.
In this section we present the results from the Panzar-Rosse H-statistics estimation by year to consider the time evolution of competition. Table 9 shows, by year, the H-statistics for Polish commercial banks, obtained from three different estimation methods (FE GLS, two-step GMM and one-step GMM). Since each estimation technique has some specific advantages and disadvantages, we take the average of the three estimates as our measure of competition intensity in Poland. Such procedure has also been applied by Claessens and Laeven (2004:571) . Upon analysis of these results, one can conclude that competition evolves differently across years in Poland. In some years, competition was relatively high, as the H-statistics reached the level of 0.75, which is relatively close to perfect competition (in 2008). Then it gradually decreased reaching its bottom line in 2010, and has been slightly increasing in since then. Generally, the values of our competitive environment measure indicate at monopolistic competition in Poland. Therefore, our results are close to those presented in other studies (see e.g. Pawłowska, 2005 and Bikker and Spierdijk, 2010 . 
CONSLUSIONS
This paper presents estimates of competition in bank loan market in Poland using a well grounded approach, indroduced by and developed in many studies. Unlike previous papers which attempt to measure the competition intensity in Poland applying annual unbalanced financial data on banking sector available in the Bankscope database, we use data which where handcollected from Monitor Polski B and webpages of commercial banks. Where it is necessary we supplement this data which information accessed from Polish Financial Supervisory Authority.
Upon analysis of results, one can conclude that competition evolves differently across years in Poland. In some years, competition was relatively high, as the H-statistics reached the level of 0.75, which is relatively close to perfect competition. In other years it gradually decreased reaching its bottom line in 2010, and took upward trend in 2011 and 2012. Generally, the values of our competitive environment measure indicate at monopolistic competition in Poland. 
APPENDICES
28.29 0.0000 Table A . Estimation of competition intensity using Random-Effects GLS regression. Wald chi2(7) = 1778.30 corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Table B . Estimation results for long run equilibirum test. Note: this table presents Panzar-Rosse H-statistics that depends on time and is calculated with application of OLS estimator. Under monopoly, the H-statistic should be smaller than or equal to zero; in the models of monopolistic competition and perfect competition, the H-statistic should lie between 0 and 1; under perfect competition, the H-statistic is equal to 1. Overall, a larger H-statistic indicates a higher degree of competition. Hfe denotes the Panzar-Rosse H-statistics calculated for consecutive years 2008-2012. The β1, β2, and β3 are elasticity coefficients of input prices, i.e. price of deposits, labor and capital, respectively. This table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses), with *,**,*** representing significance at the 10%,5% and 1%, respectively. Table E . Test for long-run equilibrium. Note: this table presents Panzar-Rosse H-statistics that depends on time and is calculated with application of FE GLS estimator. Under monopoly, the H-statistic should be smaller than or equal to zero; in the models of monopolistic competition and perfect competition, the H-statistic should lie between 0 and 1; under perfect competition, the H-statistic is equal to 1. Overall, a larger H-statistic indicates a higher degree of competition. Hfe denotes the Panzar-Rosse H-statistics calculated for consecutive years 2008-2012. The β1, β2, and β3 are elasticity coefficients of input prices, i.e. price of deposits, labor and capital, respectively. This table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses), with *,**,*** representing significance at the 10%,5% and 1%, respectively. Note: this table presents Panzar-Rosse H-statistics that depends on time and is calculated with application of FE GLS estimator. Under monopoly, the H-statistic should be smaller than or equal to zero; in the models of monopolistic competition and perfect competition, the H-statistic should lie between 0 and 1; under perfect competition, the H-statistic is equal to 1. Overall, a larger H-statistic indicates a higher degree of competition. Hfe denotes the Panzar-Rosse H-statistics calculated for consecutive years 2008-2012. The β1, β2, and β3 are elasticity coefficients of input prices, i.e. price of deposits, labor and capital, respectively. This table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses), with *,**,*** representing significance at the 10%,5% and 1%, respectively. 
Table C. Estimation of competition intensity using one-step GMM (Arellano-Bond)
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